Abstract -Econometricians have long studied the effect of price on residential water 9 demand and the impact on water use of the rate (tariff) structure in which price signals 10 are embedded. This paper applies an existing deductive model of residential water use 11 for the intermittent supply system in Amman, Jordan and simulates demand responses 12 across a cross-section of households over many uniform, increasing block, and linear 13 price (quadratic charge) rate structures at historically low and significantly higher prices. 14 Results show inelastic piped water demand responses for all rate structures at 15 historically low prices similar to findings from a prior econometric study for Amman. 16
Introduction

24
Water utility managers and economists have long been interested in the effect of price on household 25 water use as a tool to manage demand (Howe and Linaweaver 1967; Young 2005) . Econometric studies 26 typically quantify price effects as elasticities that express the percentage change in water use associated 27 with a one percent increase in price. Price-elasticity of water demand is generally observed as negative 28 and less than 1 in absolute value (inelastic). However, significant differences exist and relate to the 29 econometric regression technique, price specification, and rate structure in the study area (Dalhuisen et 30 al. 2003 ; Espey et al. 1997) . Of particular interest is how to incorporate flat charges, variable prices, and 31 nonlinear rate structures that present different prices for different levels of water use. 32
When setting prices, utilities often grapple with conflicting objectives such as to promote efficiency, 33 encourage conservation, maintain revenue neutrality (generate revenues only to recover costs), achieve 34 equity, make rates easy to implement and transparent to users, plus satisfy other political aims 35 (Chesnutt and Beecher 1998; Hanemann 1998) . Balancing these many considerations is difficult and 36 there is no single method or technique utilities use to identify and set prices. 37
Even resolving influences of the rate structure on water use or conservation potential through 38 econometric (regression) analysis has proved tricky. First, price varies with water use in nonlinear price 39 structures such as increasing or declining block rates (IBR and DBR) or linear price (resulting in quadratic 40 charge) schemes. Thus, price is endogenous (Olmstead et al. 2007 ). Second, using marginal or average 41 prices in regressions can change interpretations of price responses (Young 2005 with other utility services make price information less transparent to customers (Gaudin 2006 piped water use, and calculated an average price (total utility revenues from all simulated customers 145 divided by the total piped water use). We estimated a slope from the changes in piped water use and 146 calculated average prices across the three price schedules, then calculated a point price elasticity of 147 demand from the slope at the base calibration piped water use and average price (Rosenberg et al. 148 2007, Table 1 ). This calculated elasticity was close to the price elasticity of demand reported by an 149 econometric study of Amman households over the same time period (Salman et al. 2008) . 150
The remainder of this paper simulates piped water use and calculates ssociated price elasticities of 151 demand for several alternative uniform, IBR, and linear price (quadratic charge) rate structures at 152 historical and higher prices. Analysis focuses on demand responses, economic efficiency, cost allocation 153 among and recovery from users, and tradeoffs between rate structure components. 154
Rate Structures Simulated
155
Figure 1 shows how marginal prices and total charges can vary with consumption for several rate 156 structures. From the figure, note: 157 1. Raising or lowering the price schedule for one rate structure relative to others can adjust price 158 ordering and test, through simulation, effects to increase prices. 159 2. A uniform rate structure with no flat fee plots at the same marginal price as a uniform rate with 160 a flat fee (assuming the uniform prices are the same). 161 3. When use by all users facing an IBR falls in the first block, the IBR is effectively a uniform 162 structure. Raising prices in higher use blocks will not impact water use. To study this effect, we 163 introduce simulations that hold IBR prices constant but shrink block widths (spacing). 164 Table 3 high flat charges may encourage customers to discontinue piped service and seek alternative sources. 176
To date, few utilities use negative flat fees and utilities prefer to keep rather than drive away customers. 177
Deductive modeling and rate structure simulation can serve as a useful tool to evaluate these effects. 178
Results
179
Figure 2 shows piped water demand responses for the rate structure and price schedule simulations. 180
The average price (top) is calculated as total utility revenues from all Monte Carlo simulations divided by 181 total piped water use. The marginal price (bottom) is the price paid at the average piped water use. 182 Table 4 shows ranges of point price elasticities calculated using the two prices. and linear price rate structures are economically efficient choices to encourage water conservation, they 206 still impose significant additional costs on users compared to historical costs. 207
The uniform price schedules with low prices and no flat charges are economically efficient and impose 208 low total costs for users, but recover only a small fraction of utility costs (Figure 3, Plotting the user distribution against the cumulative share of total piped water charges users pay shows 217 cost distribution among users for the revenue neutral piped water price schedules (Figure 4 ). These 218
Lorenz curves show more equitable cost allocation compared to the 2005 historical schedule. For 219 example, the uniform and IBR price schedules collect nearly 18% of total utility revenues from the first 220 45% of users with the lowest water use. In contrast, the 2005 price schedule collected less than 5% of 221 total revenues from the same fraction of users and more than 60% of total revenues from the largest 222 10% of users. In Figure 4 , larger deviations from the 1:1 line of perfect equity (that represents a flat 223 charge structure where all users pay the same amount regardless of use) highlight larger cost allocation 224 inequalities. We quantify inequalities by the Gini coefficient which measures the area between the 1:1 225 line of perfect equity and the Lorenz curve. Thus, the uniform price schedule with a uniform charge of 226 $0.71/m 3 and flat charge of $23/quarter appears most equitable. All the revenue neutral piped water 227 price schedules more equitably allocate costs among users than the 2005 rate schedule, however, they 228 impose significant additional total costs on users compared to the historical rate structure. 229
The top left and right panels of Figure 3 show the tradeoffs between cost allocation equity, water use, 230 and user's total costs for each simulated rate structure. Here two results are notable. First, the IBR and 231 linear price structures simultaneously and significantly improve cost allocation among users and reduce 232
water use compared to the 2005 historical rate structure. However, these two rate structures also 233 significantly increase user's total costs and are not the most economically efficient options to promote 234 cost equity. Second, uniform price schedules with (i) low prices and no flat charges, and (ii) a price of 235 $0.71/m 3 and flat charges improve cost allocation among users and maintain user's total costs near 236 historical levels. These price schedules more efficiently promote more equitable cost allocation among 237
users, but maintain water use at historical levels and are not conservation oriented. 238 or cost allocation among users. In this regard, the efficient, revenue neutral rate structures that keep 271 users' total costs low are uniform price schedules with prices between $0.71 and $1.41/m 3 and flat 272 charges between $-11 and $23/customer/quarter (see Figure 4) . These price schedules also maintain 273 water use, more equitably allocate costs, and will, on average, only increase user's total cost by 274 $80/customer/year compared to the historical rate structure. The existing mixed IBR/linear rate 275 structure subsidizes most users in the first two blocks, recovers less than 65% of costs, and motivates 276 significant increases in prices and user's total costs to achieve revenue neutrality. 277
Deductive model results also show that IBR, IBR with shrinking block width, and linear price schedules 278 appear conservation oriented because they can significantly reduce water use, recover costs, and more 279 equitably allocate costs among users. However, these rate structures, on average, increase user's total 280 costs more than $120/customer/year over the existing rate structure. And despite estimated reductions 281 of approximately 30 m 3 /customer/year, the $4/m 3 user cost for conserved water with these rate 282 structures is much more expensive than the $1-2/m 3 cost of the Amman utility's other supply options, 283
Zara Ma'een, the Disi aquifer, and the Red-Dead canal (Alqam et al. 2008 ). The conservation oriented 284 rate structures only become attractive if the comparison point is a revenue-neutral uniform structure 285 discussed above rather than the existing mixed IBR/linear rate structure. 286 Rosenberg et al. (2007) present limitations of deductive modeling which we summarize here. First, the 287 model assumes simulated households minimize costs to meet initial estimates of water use. These initial 288 estimates set upper bounds for optimal uses; simulated customers can choose from an exhaustive set of 289 supply or conservation actions to set use at or below the initial estimate, but they have no incentive to 290 increase use beyond initial estimates such as to expand their garden area or take longer or more 291 frequent showers should water prices decrease or water become more available. Put another way, the 292 model is built and calibrated to current and prior water use behaviors observed when only a small 293 volume of cheap water was available to users. Second, households minimize their expected water 294 management costs rather than maximize utility or minimize cost deviations. 4. Conservation-oriented IBR, IBR with shrinking block width, and linear price rate structures seem 331 best able to simultaneously reduce water use, recover costs, and more equitably allocate costs 332 among users. However, these rate structures significantly increase users' total costs with the likely 333 benefits from conservation less than the added costs the rate structures impose on users. 334 5. The conservation-oriented rate structures may be desirable if compared to a revenue-neutral 335 uniform rate structure rather than the existing and historical mixed IBR/linear rate structure. 336 6. The Amman utility can adjust flat and uniform price components of a uniform structure to 337 simultaneously promote efficiency, recover costs, and more equitably allocate costs among users. 338
Overall, deductive modeling and rate structure simulation shows how to integrate various rate 339 structure, pricing, conservation, water availability, and other household behavioral factors into a 340 common approach to model and understand household water use in intermittent supply systems. 341
Further, modeling indentifies tradeoffs among rate structures and price schedule components to 342 achieve key rate setting objectives such as to promote efficiency, reduce water use, recover costs, and 343 more equitably allocate costs among users. 344 
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